Firing Tax vs. Severance Payment - An Unequal Comparison by Wesselbaum, Dennis
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Firing Tax vs. Severance Payment - An
Unequal Comparison
Dennis Wesselbaum
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel University
2. October 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17637/
MPRA Paper No. 17637, posted 4. October 2009 13:45 UTC
Firing Tax vs. Severance
Payment - An Unequal
Comparison*
Dennis Wesselbaum
Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Kiel University
October 3, 2009
Abstract
The eﬀects of ﬁring costs crucially depend on the extend to which the
additional costs can be shifted to the worker, which refers to the so called
"bonding critique". In the recent literature about ﬁring costs, these costs
are assumed to be a wasteful tax, such that they can not be shifted to
the worker. In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects from respecting and non-
respecting the bonding critique. We consistently show, that ﬁring costs
have to be introduced in a diﬀerent way as severance payments. If they are
introduced in a similar way, results are likely to be diﬀerent, in particular
for ﬂuctuations of vacancies, unemployment and wages.
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1 Introduction
Following Lazear (1988, 1990) and Nickell (1997) the impact of ﬁring costs cru-
cially depends on the extent to which the additional costs can be transferred to
the worker due to wage adjustments. In this spirit, the ﬁrm reduces the wage for
new hires by the present value of future ﬁring costs and hence the wage bill of the
worker remains unchanged. To avoid this "problem" the recent literature about
ﬁring costs follows the "standard view of ﬁring costs" in the sense of Bertola and
Rogerson (1997), i.e. ﬁring costs are a wasteful tax on job destruction. This tax
reﬂects real costs on separations and, since it is paid outside the ﬁrm-worker pair,
the ﬁrm is not able to include these costs within the wage bargaining process,
since it is non-Coasean. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) show that empirically
ﬁring costs have two intrinsic elements (i) transfers from ﬁrm to worker and (ii)
a tax that is paid outside the ﬁrm-worker pair. While ﬁring costs, i.e. (ii), are
taxes, e.g. administrative or procedural costs1, severance payments, i.e. (i), are
paid directly to the worker, increasing consumption opportunities. Now, how
to introduce ﬁring costs properly? A severance payment for instance, has to be
implemented within the bargaining problem and the worker's asset value func-
tions, whereas the ﬁring costs - by deﬁnition - can not be treated in this way.
To be precisely, in the following ﬁring costs are a wasteful tax - not inﬂuencing
the bargaining process - and severance payments are payments to the worker -
inﬂuencing the bargaining and the consumption path. We show that ﬁring taxes
have to be introduced in a diﬀerent way as severance payments. If they are in-
troduced in a similar way results are likely to be diﬀerent. However, the overall
performance diﬀerences are relatively small. The largest diﬀerences are obtained
for the standard deviation of vacancies, unemployment and wages.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we will derive the baseline
model for later analysis and show two diﬀerent ways to introduce ﬁring costs
and a possible way to introduce severance payments. Then, we will simulate the
model and discuss the diﬀerences within the three approaches. Finally we will
draw the conclusion.
1See e.g. Delacroix (2003).
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2 Model Derivation
2.1 The Household's Problem
We assume a discrete-time economy with an inﬁnite living representative house-
hold who seeks to maximize its utility given by
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt − 1
1− σ
]
, (1)
where σ gives the degree of risk aversion. The household inelastically supplies one
unit of labor, represented by the unit interval. Furthermore, household members
pool there income as in Merz (1995). The household maximizes consumption and
real money holding subject to the budget constraint
Ct +
Bt
Pt
=Wt +Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
+ but + Πt + Tt. (2)
Where b is the value of home production, Wt is labor income and Bt is Bond
holding which pays a gross interest rate Rt. Πt are aggregate proﬁts and Tt are
real lump sum transfers from the government. The demand function is given by
Cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−
Ct, where Pt =
∫ 1
0
[
P
−1

it di
] 
−1
is the price index.
The FOC is given by
C−σt = βRtEt
[
Pt
Pt+1
C−σt+1
]
, (3)
being a standard Euler equation.
2.2 The Firm's Problem
Monopolistically competitive ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts by setting their price
with respect to the households demand function, the production function and
the employment evolution equation. Each ﬁrm consists of a continuum of diﬀer-
ent jobs. While aggregate productivity At is common to all ﬁrms, the speciﬁc
productivity ait is idiosyncratic and every period it is drawn in advance of the
production process from a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f. F (a). The ﬁrm
speciﬁc production function is the product of aggregate productivity, the number
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of jobs and the aggregate over individual jobs and can be written as
yit = Atnit
∫
a˜it
a
f(a)
1− F (a˜it)da ≡ AtnitH(a˜it). (4)
Where a˜it is an endogenously determined critical threshold. If the speciﬁc pro-
ductivity of a job is below this threshold, it is not proﬁtable and separation
takes place. This consideration results in an endogenous job destruction rate
ρit = F (a˜it). Although their is no consensus in the literature on the proper de-
termination of the separation margin, following Fujita et al. (2007), Fujita and
Ramey (2007, 2008) and Ramey (2008) empirical evidence seems to favor endoge-
nous separations. Balleer (2009) shows that the separation rate increases after
a positive technology shock, while Barnichon (2009) shows that around business
cycle turning points the separation rate is causative for most of unemployment
movements. Since employment decisions are subject to matching frictions, we
introduce a Cobb-Douglas type matching function with constant returns to scale,
i.e. Ψ(ut, vt) = mu
µ
t v
1−µ
t . ut is the number of unemployed worker, vt is the
number of open vacancies, assumed to lie on the unit interval and µ ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the elasticity of the matching function. The match eﬃciency is governed
by m > 0. The underlying homogeneity assumption leads to the probability of
a vacancy being ﬁlled q(θt) = mθ
−µ
t , where labor market tightness is given by
θt = vt/ut. Connecting the results for job creation and job destruction enables
us to determine the evolution of employment at ﬁrm i as
nit+1 = (1− ρit+1)(nit + vitq(θt)). (5)
The ﬁrm controls the evolution of employment by adjusting the number of va-
cancies and by setting the critical threshold. As we will illustrate later on the
worker is paid according to his speciﬁc productivity and we follow this approach
by establishing the theorem that ﬁring costs also depend on the worker's speciﬁc
productivity. Initially, we deﬁne the ﬁring costs function for a speciﬁc worker as
a linear real-valued function given by g(ait) = kait,
2 such that total ﬁring costs
2Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and Kramarz and Michaud (2004) show in their empirical work
that the estimated function for severance payments is roughly linear.
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evolve as follows
G(ait) = k
∫ a˜it
0
a
f(a)
1− F (a˜it)da, (6)
where k > 0 is the share of the productivity wasted as a tax. The function
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly convex and strictly increasing in a.
One should notice that we likewise could have introduced a ﬁring cost function
that features the individual real wage as an argument. However, our approach is
w.l.o.g. since the wage also depends on the idiosyncratic productivity, i.e. this is
only a scaling issue.
The ﬁrm maximizes the present value of real proﬁts given by
Πi0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
[
Pit
Pt
yit −Wit − cvit −G(ait)− ψ
2
(
Pit
Pit−1
− pi
)2
Yt
]
. (7)
Where the ﬁrst term in parenthesis is real revenue, the second term is the wage
bill, which is given by the aggregate of individual wages
Wit = nit
∫
a˜it
wt(a)
f(a)
1− F (a˜it)da. (8)
This follows from the fact that the wage is not identical for all workers, instead it
depends on the idiosyncratic productivity. The third term reﬂects the total costs
of posting a vacancy, with c > 0 giving real costs per vacancy. The next term
gives the total ﬁring costs and the latter term formalizes staggered price setting
à la Rotemberg (1982). The degree of the price adjustment costs is measured
by the parameter ψ ≥ 0. The current period average value of workers across
job-speciﬁc productivities is given by ξt and ϕt reﬂects real marginal costs, given
by
ϕt =
∂Wt/∂nt
AtH(a˜t)
+
ξt − c/q(θt)
AtH(a˜t)
. (9)
The job creation condition is given by
c
q(θt)
= Etβt+1(1− ρt+1)
[
ϕt+1At+1H(a˜t+1)− ∂Wt+1
∂nt+1
+
c
q(θt+1)
]
. (10)
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This condition reﬂects the hiring decision as a trade-oﬀ between the costs of a
vacancy and the expected return. Where 1/q(θt) is the duration of the relation-
ship between ﬁrm and worker. The lower the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, the
longer the duration of existing contracts, because the ﬁrm is not able to replace
the worker instantaneously. Subsequently, we introduce three diﬀerent ways to
introduce separation costs.
2.3 The Bargaining Problem
2.3.1 Respecting the Bonding Critique
In this section we will strictly respect the bonding critique, i.e. we do not intro-
duce the ﬁring costs into the bargaining problem and the asset value function.
Due to search frictions in the market, the match shares and economic rent, which
is splitted in individual Nash bargaining. We maximize the Nash product
w = argmax
{
(Wt − Ut)η(Jt − Vt)1−η
}
. (11)
0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the relative bargaining power and due to a free entry condition the
equilibrium value of Vt is zero. Consistently, the individual real wage satisﬁes the
optimality condition
Wt(at)− Ut = η
1− ηJt(at). (12)
To obtain an explicit expression for the individual real wage we have to determine
the asset value functions and substitute them into the Nash bargaining solution
(12). For the ﬁrm the asset value of the job depends on the real revenue, the real
wage and if the job is not destroyed, the discounted future value. Otherwise the
job is destroyed and hence has zero value. In terms of a Bellman equation the
asset value is given by
Jt(at) = ϕtAtat − wt(at) + Etβt+1
(
(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Jt+1(a)
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da
)
. (13)
The asset value of being employed for the worker consists of the real wage, the
discounted continuation value and in case of separation the value of being unem-
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ployed
Wt(at) = wt(at) + Etβt+1(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Wt+1(a)
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da (14)
+ Etβt+1ρt+1Ut+1.
Analogously, the asset value of a job seeker is given by
Ut = b+ Etβt+1θtq(θt)(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Wt+1
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da (15)
+ Etβt+1(1− θtq(θt)(1− ρt+1))Ut+1.
Unemployed worker receive the value of home production b, the discounted con-
tinuation value of being unemployed and if he is matched he receives the value
of future employment. Inserting these value functions into the Nash bargaining
solution yields the individual real wage
wt(at) = η(ϕtAtat + cθt) + (1− η)b. (16)
The ﬁrm will endogenously separate from a worker if and only if
Jt(at) < −kat, (17)
i.e. if the worker's asset value is lower than the associated ﬁring costs.3
After some algebra, the threshold is deﬁned by
a˜t =
1
(1− η)ϕtAt + k
[
(1− η)b+ ηcθt − c
q(θt)
]
. (18)
2.3.2 Non-Respecting the Bonding Critique
In contrast to the precedent section, we now introduce the ﬁring costs within the
bargaining problem and the asset value functions. Therefore the Nash bargining
problem now looks as follows
w = argmax
{
(Wt − Ut)η(Jt − Vt + kat)1−η
}
. (19)
3See Kugler and Saint-Paul (2000, 2004) and Lechthaler et al. (2008).
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The optimality condition then consitently changes to
Wt(at)− Ut = η
1− η (Jt(at) + kat) . (20)
The asset value functions now are given by
Jt(at) = ϕtAtat − wt(at) (21)
+ Etβt+1
(
(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Jt+1(a)
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da− ρt+1kat
)
,
Wt(at) = wt(at) + Etβt+1(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Wt+1(a)
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da (22)
+ Etβt+1ρt+1Ut+1,
Ut = b+ Etβt+1θtq(θt)(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Wt+1
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da (23)
+ Etβt+1(1− θtq(θt)(1− ρt+1))Ut+1.
Some algebra then gives the expression for the individual real wage
wt(at) = η
(
ϕtAtat + cθt + (1− βt+1ρt+1)kat
)
+ (1− η)b. (24)
The introduction of ﬁring costs increases the individual real wage due to the
change in the fall back position of the ﬁrm. Having discussed the wage setting
process we sequentially want to focus on the ﬁring decision and the corresponding
threshold.
Since we now have a new expression for the wage, we consistently have to change
the threshold, which is given by
a˜t =
1
(1− η)ϕtAt + (1− η + (η − 1)βt+1ρt+1)k
[
(1− η)b+ ηcθt − c
q(θt)
]
, (25)
where (1− η+ (η− 1)βt+1ρt+1)k > 0 such that ﬁring cost decrease the threshold,
i.e. protect less productive worker.
2.3.3 Severance Payments
Severance payments are close to the last subsection, in which I introduced the
ﬁring costs into the bargaining problem and the asset value functions. However,
this approach goes beyond this adjustment in the sense that now the worker's
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asset value functions are inﬂuenced. The reason is straightforward: a severance
payment is directly transferred to the worker and hence she considers this ex-
pected income in case of separation in the bargaining process. Consistently, the
asset value function in case of being unemployed now looks as follows4
Ut = b+ ρt+1kat + Etβt+1θtq(θt)(1− ρt+1)
∫
a˜t+1
Wt+1
f(a)
1− F (a˜t+1)da (26)
+ Etβt+1(1− θtq(θt)(1− ρt+1))Ut+1.
The individual real wage is given by
wt(at) = η
(
ϕtAtat + cθt + (1− βt+1ρt+1)kat
)
+ (1− η)b+ (1− η)ρt+1kat. (27)
The introduction of ﬁring costs increases the individual real wage due to the
change in the fall back position of the ﬁrm. Having discussed the wage setting
process we sequentially want to focus on the ﬁring decision and the corresponding
threshold.
The threshold for the severance payments case is given by
a˜t =
(1− η)b+ ηcθt − cq(θt)
(1− η)ϕtAt + (1− η + (η − 1)βt+1ρt+1 − (1− η)ρt+1)k , (28)
where (1− η + (η − 1)βt+1ρt+1 − (1− η)ρt+1)k > 0 such that ﬁring cost decrease
the threshold, i.e. protect less productive worker.
3 Model solution
The New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC, for short) is given by
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + κϕˆt, (29)
where κ = (− 1)/ψ.
The model is then log-linearized around the steady state and simulated using the
software package Dynare. In addition, we need to deﬁne the aggregate income
4Where J and W remain the same as in 2.3.2.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Note
σ 2 Smets and Wouters (2007)
β 0.99 Standard value
 11 Trigari (2004)
η 0.5 Symmetric Bargaining
µ 0.5 Hosios Rule
ψ 105 To equal Calvo staggering
µLN 0 Mean of Idiosyncratic Productivity
σLN 0.12 Cooley and Quadrini (1999)
ρA 0.9 Cooley and Quadrini (1999)
k 0.1 Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
φy 0.125 Standard value
φpi 1.5 Standard value
given by
Yt =Wt + Πt = Atnt
∫
a˜it
a
f(a)
1− F (a˜it)da. (30)
We assume a productivity shock that is AR(1), i.e.
At = ρAAt−1 + αA,t, (31)
where 0 < ρA < 1 is the autocorrelation of the shock and αA,t ∼ N(0, σA) is an
i.i.d. error term following an univariate normal density distribution with standard
deviation σA and cov(At−1, αA,t) = 0 ∀ t.
Monetary policy targets the nominal interest rate by a standard Taylor rule, i.e.
it = φyyt + φpipit. (32)
We calibrate the model on a quarterly basis for the U.S. and set parameter values
according to some stylized facts and the recent literature shown in Table 1.
The steady state separation rate ρ¯ is 0.10 according to den Haan et al. (2000).
The critical threshold can be computed by building the inverse function, i.e.
a˜ = F−1(ρ). The steady state unemployment rate is set to u¯ = 0.12. This rel-
atively high value of steady state unemployment reﬂects the shortcoming of the
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unemployment rate namely the nonconformity of eﬀective searchers and unem-
ployed workers.5 Steady state ﬁrm matching rate is q¯ = 0.7 according to den
Haan et al. (2000).
4 Discussion
Consider a one percent aggregate productivity shock. Our results for the three
diﬀerent speciﬁcations are presented in Table 1. We can infer that the variability
of output and inﬂation do not signiﬁcantly vary over the three diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations, whereas a rough graphical analysis yields the insight that the respecting
case has unambiguously much larger deviations from the steady state in all vari-
ables (see Figure 1). Related to the ﬂuctuation of the job creation rate and
the stated correlations, there is not much diﬀerence across the three approaches.
However, a more or less signiﬁcant diﬀerence is obtained in the variability of the
job destruction rate, while unemployment and vacancies show diﬀerent volatil-
ities across approaches. Coherently, labor market tightness behaves diﬀerently,
since it is created by these two variables. We obtain the largest diﬀerences in the
real wage, being almost twice as volatile in the respecting case as in the severance
case. This is straightforward and a direct consequence of the diﬀerent implemen-
tation approaches. In the two cases, non-respecting and severance, separation
costs directly inﬂuence the wage and hence decrease their volatility, since they
decrease the heterogeneity across matches. The main diﬀerences across the ap-
proaches are caused by two transmission channels, namely (i) the entry site and
(ii) the exit site channel. While the wage is rather an entry site eﬀect (consider
the job creation condition), the threshold is an exit site eﬀect (since it determines
separations). Therefore, more variability in wages implies a higher volatility in
vacancies and a higher ﬂuctuation of the threshold implies more volatility in
employment and less volatility in unemployment.
Finally, we can summarize our ﬁndings as follows
1. The overall diﬀerences in business cycle ﬂuctuations are relatively small.
2. Non-Respecting and severance payments show an - almost - identical be-
havior.
5See Cole and Rogerson (1999) for further discussion.
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Table 2: Business Cycle Fluctuations
Data Respecting Non-Respecting Severance
Standard Deviations
Output 1.6200 3.2729 3.3565 3.4083
Inﬂation 1.1100 1.7688 1.8132 1.8411
Real Wage 0.6900 0.2214 0.1496 0.1086
Unemployment 6.9000 7.6637 8.3308 8.7431
Employment n.a. 6.8863 1.3985 1.4468
Vacancies 8.2700 2.1091 1.5771 1.8242
Tightness 14,9600 5.5667 6.7775 6.9405
a˜ n.a. 1.7635 0.4004 0.4165
JCR 2,5500 5.4728 5.6253 5.9804
JDR 3,7300 6.0788 6.3859 6.7532
Correlations
u,v -0,9500 0.6401 0.6060 0.6142
jcr,jdr -0,3600 0.9958 0.9878 0.9906
Notes: Data responds to U.S. values taken from Krause and Lubik (2007).
3. Vacancies and wages are mostly inﬂuenced by the diﬀerent concepts.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the eﬀects of ﬁring costs, to a certain extend,
depend on the way they are implemented. To be more precisely, there is a per-
formance diﬀerence whether one talks about ﬁring costs or severance payments.
In particular ﬁring costs, being a wasteful tax, can not be introduced into the
bargaining process and the asset value functions. In contrast, severance payments
have to be implemented within the bargaining process, the asset value function
of the ﬁrm and the asset value function of the worker. We have shown that the
impulse response functions following from non-respecting the bonding critique
are close to the correspondings IRFs for severance payments and hence proved
that one has to respect the bonding critique.
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 Figure 2: Non-Respecting the Bonding Critique.
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 Figure 3: Severance Payments.
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